Havana Syndrome: the reporting, science and unanswered questions
Explore Whale Hunting’s Havana Syndrome reporting, The Sound podcast, medical evidence, device claims and the 2026 recall of intelligence assessments.

Havana Syndrome is the name given to unexplained health incidents reported by diplomats, intelligence officers and their families, initially in Cuba and later elsewhere, with symptoms including head pain, dizziness, balance problems and cognitive difficulties (National Academies assessment). The question is not whether people have suffered, but what caused their symptoms, whether the same explanation fits different incidents, and what evidence can establish responsibility (NIH findings and limitations).
Our reporting has followed the story from The Sound, Brazen’s 2023 podcast, to the science of a possible weapon, affected families’ accounts and allegations that government agencies failed their own personnel. This guide brings that work together and distinguishes our reporting and analysis from official assessments, scientific findings and questions still unresolved.
Last reviewed: 10 November 2026. Where things stand: no public official finding has identified a cause or a perpetrator. The 2023 and 2025 intelligence assessments that judged foreign involvement “very unlikely” were recalled in June 2026 (House Intelligence Committee statement), and our review located no public replacement. The Pentagon made its first compensation payments in July (Department of War, 10 July 2026). Since our last review in September, outside reporting has added claims about Russian involvement, Canadian diplomats and new cases near Washington; they are set out below with the responses they drew.
Where the official record stands
Eight years of official answers, and which still stand
Left: statements that point toward a weapon or a foreign role. Right: statements that point away. Placement shows the direction of each statement, not the strength of its evidence.
- Nov 2018Points away from oneJASON scientific advisers, for the State Department“No plausible single source of energy (neither radio/microwaves nor sonic) can produce both the recorded audio/video signals and the reported medical effects.”On recordReport, redacted
- Dec 2020Points toward a weapon or foreign roleNational Academies of SciencesDirected, pulsed radiofrequency energy “appears to be the most plausible mechanism” among those considered; “no hypothesis has been proven.”On recordReport summary
- Feb 2022Points toward a weapon or foreign roleIntelligence-community experts panel“Pulsed electromagnetic energy, particularly in the radiofrequency range, plausibly explains the core characteristics, although information gaps exist.”On recordExecutive summary
- Mar 2023Points away from oneIntelligence-community assessmentForeign adversary involvement judged “very unlikely.”RecalledCNN on the recall
- Mar 2024Neither: medical or proceduralNational Institutes of HealthNo significant MRI-detectable brain injury in participants compared with control groups. NIH said symptoms could be real and disabling, and did not rule out an earlier injury. It did not address cause.On recordNIH summary
- Dec 2024Points toward a weapon or foreign roleHouse Intelligence Committee, CIA subcommittee“Increasingly likely a foreign adversary is responsible for some portion of reported AHIs.” ODNI said at the time that it disagreed with many of the findings.Interim reportCommittee release · CBS News
- Jan 2025Points away from oneUpdated intelligence-community assessmentMost components kept “very unlikely”; one assessed a “roughly even chance” of use against a small, undetermined subset.RecalledAssessment text
- Jun 2026Neither: medical or proceduralDirector of National IntelligenceThe 2023 and 2025 assessments were recalled on 11 June. The recall memo released no new evidence, and no public replacement has been published.No replacementCommittee statement · The Guardian
- Jul 2026Neither: medical or proceduralDepartment of DefenseFirst HAVANA Act payments, nearly $3 million, and a team renamed for “directed energy bio-effects.” Payment recognises injury; it is not a finding of cause.Not a findingDepartment of War
Start with our reporting · Listen to The Sound · Developments in 2026 · Read the evidence · Timeline · Reporting notes and contact
Start with our reporting
These five pieces form the main written investigation, in publication order. Some require a free account; this guide is intended to remain open to everyone.
- The science and engineering: 2 July 2025. Bradley Hope and Clara Preve’s “Is Havana Syndrome a Microwave Weapon?” examines the microwave hypothesis, the Frey auditory effect, competing expert views and the practical challenge of concealing an effective device. Read it as an exploration of a possible mechanism, not proof that a particular person was exposed to one.
- The people and medical evidence: 27 August 2025. Bradley Hope and Clara Preve’s “The Immaculate Concussions” centres on Mark Lenzi and his family in Guangzhou, his account of their symptoms and treatment, and the clinical findings discussed in the reporting. It also examines computational research; neither an individual clinical assessment nor a model by itself identifies an attacker or establishes a common cause across all reported incidents.
- The attribution argument: 4 November 2025. Clara Preve’s “Havana Syndrome: Only Two Nations on Earth” compares Russian and Chinese research, revisits the Soviet-era Moscow Signal and includes an interview with former national security adviser John Bolton. The piece argues that Russia is the more likely perpetrator; that is the investigation’s analysis, not a publicly established attribution.
- The government response: 18 December 2025. Clara Preve’s “Havana Syndrome: The Cover-Up” brings together interviews with Marc Polymeropoulos, Lenzi, Bolton, John Sipher, James Schumaker and former officials who describe failures of care or concealment. It connects their accounts with historical records and congressional scrutiny; allegations of deliberate obstruction should be distinguished from documented administrative failures and any eventual legal findings.
- The reported device: 14 January 2026. In “Havana Syndrome is Back”, Clara Preve follows up CNN’s report of a device acquired for U.S. government testing, speaking to Lenzi, attorney Mark Zaid and a former CIA officer. It is the latest dedicated written instalment located in our archive for this guide; subsequent outside reporting and the June assessment recall are covered below.
For the earlier starting point, read “The Mystery of Havana Syndrome,” published 23 January 2023. Bradley Hope introduces a guest contribution by Zachary Dorfman on the intelligence-community disputes surrounding the story and Dorfman’s reporting contribution to The Sound.
Listen to The Sound

The Sound: Mystery of Havana Syndrome is an eight-part investigation hosted by Nicky Woolf, produced by Project Brazen and Goat Rodeo in partnership with PRX. Released from January to March 2023, it follows the early incidents, the search for a mechanism and the human consequences; it is a record of that investigation, not a substitute for the later developments in this guide (episode archive).
- Begin with the reported incidents: “Jericho” and “The Immaculate Concussion” trace the first accounts and the early U.S. and Cuban investigations (chapters one and two).
- Follow the competing explanations: “Speak of the Devil,” “The Frey Effect” and “The Great British Nuke Off” explore psychological explanations, microwave science and an attempt to build a device (chapters three to five).
- Follow the people and the reporting’s conclusions: “A Silent Injury,” “The Two Exits” and “Hammers and Nails” return to affected officials, Cuba and the question of what comes next (chapters six to eight).
The International Spy Museum discussion adds a conversation with Woolf, Polymeropoulos and Zaid, moderated by historian Andrew Hammond. You can also find the series on Apple Podcasts.
What changed in 2026
Latest: September to November 2026
On 13 October, Crown published The Havana Syndrome by Michael Rey and Oriana Zill de Granados, the 60 Minutes producers behind CBS’s 2024 and 2026 investigations (Penguin Random House). Ahead of publication, The Guardian reported the book’s account that a 2019 CIA headquarters inquiry found phones linked to Russian intelligence officers near some suspected incidents, including in London and Warsaw, and that the then CIA director, Gina Haspel, objected that the findings were not solid enough to take to the president (The Guardian’s report, syndicated by AOL).
Former CIA director Bill Burns told the paper it was “simply not true that there was a ‘cover-up’ by the CIA” (same report). A review in The Cipher Brief called the evidence for a Russian campaign circumstantial and the cover-up allegation “far-fetched” (The Cipher Brief review). The book’s claims rest on its authors’ sources; the underlying records have not been published for independent examination.
In Canada, The Globe and Mail reported on 28 September, citing two unnamed sources, that a Canadian diplomat had shared intelligence with American spies in Havana during 2016–18 and that Canadians had used satellite equipment brought into Cuba under U.S. diplomatic cover (The Globe and Mail, 28 September 2026). Global Affairs Canada said its reporting officers are not involved in covert intelligence operations (same report).
Prime Minister Mark Carney said Ottawa had a duty of care to the diplomats and asked for a detailed briefing (The Globe and Mail, 29 September 2026). In October, the government said it was open to mediation in the diplomats’ lawsuit, while maintaining that investigators “found no evidence attributing the cause of these health symptoms to a foreign actor” (The Globe and Mail, 19 October 2026). John Bolton, interviewed for our November 2025 investigation, told the paper that Washington and Ottawa had failed to investigate a possible Russian role adequately (The Globe and Mail, 2 October 2026).
On 26 October, Mark Lenzi, whose family’s experience is at the centre of our August 2025 investigation, wrote in The Hill that the House Intelligence Committee had produced a report on the government’s handling of the incidents but had not released it; he said committee leaders attributed the delay to the CIA’s pace of declassification (The Hill, 26 October 2026). That is his account; we did not locate a published final report or a committee statement on its timing. We also located no new public Russian response to the autumn reporting; the Kremlin’s 2024 denial is noted below.
The same day, the journalist Catherine Herridge reported at least six new suspected cases treated at Walter Reed since the summer; she said Walter Reed had not responded to her questions, and no U.S. agency has publicly confirmed the cases (Herridge’s report).
A reported device, but no public case-by-case proof
In January, CNN reported that the Pentagon had been evaluating a device acquired through a covert operation, with some investigators suspecting a link to Havana Syndrome (CNN, 13 January 2026). Our follow-up the next day recorded responses from sources who said they had heard about such testing.
On 8 March, CBS’s 60 Minutes reported that undercover Homeland Security agents had obtained a miniaturised microwave device through a Russian criminal network and that U.S. military tests on animals produced injuries consistent with those seen in people (CBS transcript). CBS said it had not seen the device: the account depended on confidential sources, the testing remained classified, and the Pentagon declined to comment (CBS’s account and responses).
That reporting changes what readers should know about the search for a device, but does not publicly establish that the reported equipment caused any particular incident (CBS transcript). A reported Russian component or purchase through a Russian criminal network is not, by itself, proof of an operation directed by the Russian state.
A separate strand emerged in February, when The Washington Post reported that a government scientist in Norway had tested a pulsed-microwave device on himself in 2024 and developed symptoms similar to those reported by U.S. personnel, prompting visits by Pentagon and White House officials. People familiar with the test said it did not show that a foreign adversary had targeted Americans, only that such devices can affect human biology (Reuters’ summary of the Post report, 14 February 2026).
The intelligence assessments were recalled
On 11 June, House Intelligence Committee chairman Rick Crawford welcomed Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard’s recall of two assessments on anomalous health incidents (committee statement). CNN identified them as the assessments released in 2023 and January 2025 and reported ODNI’s criticism that they excluded relevant intelligence, suppressed alternative analysis and relied on flawed processes (CNN, 12 June 2026).
The recall came in the last weeks of Gabbard’s tenure; she had announced on 22 May that she would resign, effective 30 June (Reuters, 22 May 2026). Three months earlier, at the committee’s annual threats hearing, Crawford said it was his “clear opinion that individuals in the intelligence community were involved in a cover-up,” and intelligence leaders agreed to revisit the 2025 assessment (SpyTalk, 20 March 2026).
Those criticisms are consequential official statements about the assessments’ integrity, not a published technical demonstration of a weapon or an adjudicated finding against a perpetrator (committee statement). The recall memo released no new evidence and supplied no revised assessment (The Guardian’s report); our review for this guide did not locate a public replacement establishing a cause or responsibility. The older assessments are linked here as historical records, explicitly marked as recalled.
Care and compensation remain separate questions
The HAVANA Act of 2021 authorised payments to eligible affected personnel and families; a December 2025 amendment extended eligibility to qualifying injuries dating back to 11 September 2001 (Federal Register, 27 October 2026). On 10 July 2026, the Pentagon said it had disbursed nearly $3 million, which it described as the first HAVANA Act payments under any administration, and renamed its Anomalous Health Incidents team the Directed Energy Bio-Effects Cross-Functional Team (Department of War). The BBC, reporting the payments, described the cause of the illness as unresolved (BBC, 11 July 2026).
On 27 October, the Justice Department published a final rule implementing the Act, effective 27 November 2026; it notes that there is no diagnostic code or set of criteria for these incidents (Federal Register). The Senate Armed Services Committee’s version of the 2027 defence bill would set staffing for the Pentagon team’s attribution, care and research work and authorise $10 million for attribution research, according to Senator Jeanne Shaheen’s office (Shaheen, 11 June 2026). The team’s new name describes its focus; it is not an official finding that directed energy caused any incident.
A separate lawsuit asks the courts to extend medical recognition to civilians. On 23 June 2026, seven individuals and Targeted Justice, Inc., a group that says it fights for “Targeted Individuals”, sued the CDC, the National Institutes of Health and the NIH director, Jay Bhattacharya, in federal court in Tampa (Ber v. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, No. 8:26-cv-01822). They ask the court to order the agencies to recognise anomalous health incidents in civilians, issue diagnostic guidance, set up civilian surveillance and give civilians access to NIH research and treatment (Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse). The government moved to dismiss on 5 October, arguing that the court lacks jurisdiction because the suit identifies no discrete or final agency action (Bloomberg Law). After the plaintiffs amended their complaint, the judge denied that motion as moot on 26 October and set a new deadline for the government’s response (court docket). The court has not ruled on the claims. Targeted Justice and the lead plaintiff lost an earlier suit alleging directed-energy attacks: the Fifth Circuit called those claims “frivolous” in March 2024 (opinion), and the Supreme Court declined to hear the case (docket 24-91).
Recognition of suffering and access to care should not be confused with a forensic finding about what caused an individual incident. Our reporting on families’ medical experiences and the government response follows both the health consequences and the fight for accountability.
What the evidence can and cannot establish
Scientific plausibility is not proof of exposure
The National Academies’ 2020 assessment found directed, pulsed radiofrequency energy the most plausible mechanism among those it considered, particularly for the distinctive early symptoms described by some personnel. The committee also said no hypothesis had been proven, lacked individual-level information, and considered it likely that multiple factors explained some cases and differences between them (report summary).
In February 2022, an intelligence-community experts panel concluded that “pulsed electromagnetic energy, particularly in the radiofrequency range, plausibly explains the core characteristics, although information gaps exist” (panel executive summary). Its chair, the Stanford professor David Relman, has since said that a subset of cases is most plausibly explained by pulsed microwave exposure, while many other reports could have different explanations (The Guardian’s report).
The distinction matters when reading our science and engineering investigation: a mechanism that could produce an effect still needs evidence connecting it to an actual exposure. The article’s device renderings and interactive visualisation are exploratory illustrations, not photographs of recovered equipment or validated reconstructions of an incident.
Medical findings and causal claims are different
In March 2024, NIH researchers reported no significant MRI-detectable brain injury or differences in most clinical measures between the participants reporting incidents and comparison groups (NIH summary). NIH stressed that symptoms could be real, disabling and prolonged, and that the absence of an MRI-detectable difference did not exclude an earlier adverse event affecting the brain (NIH’s stated limitations).
In September 2024, NIH said it had stopped the study after finding informed-consent requirements were not met because of coercion, which it said was not perpetrated by NIH researchers (MedPage Today’s report of NIH’s response). NIH also said those findings did not affect the study’s conclusions; stopping the study on ethical grounds should not be described as a scientific retraction (same report).
Our Lenzi investigation reports individual clinical findings and testimony that readers should consider alongside the broader studies. Different patient groups, testing dates and methods complicate direct comparisons; no single scan or group result can settle every reported case (study differences and responses).
The sceptical case
Not every expert accepts a weapon explanation. The sociologist Robert Bartholomew and the neurologist Robert Baloh have called the story a case of mass psychogenic illness, and the neuroscientist Douglas Fields has argued that energy-weapon theories “defy the laws of physics” (The Guardian’s report). A 2018 report by the JASON scientific advisory group cast strong doubt on a radiofrequency weapon, and the FBI concluded that many of those affected may have suffered from mass psychogenic illness, according to The Cipher Brief’s review.
Readers should weigh these views alongside the clinical findings above. Scepticism about a weapon is not the same as doubting that people were harmed, and the evidence may not support a single explanation for every reported case.
Capability, attribution and responses
The historical January 2025 intelligence assessment, recalled in June 2026, drew a distinction between whether an adversary possessed a relevant capability and whether it had used one. Most components retained the “very unlikely” judgment on foreign responsibility, while one assessed a “roughly even chance” of use against a small, undetermined subset; those were intelligence judgments, not identified perpetrators or resolved individual cases (assessment text).
In December 2024, the House Intelligence Committee’s CIA subcommittee said it was “increasingly likely a foreign adversary is responsible for some portion of reported AHIs” and that the 2023 assessment had been developed “in a manner inconsistent with analytic integrity and thoroughness” (interim report release). ODNI said at the time that it disagreed with many of the findings and called the claim that information had been withheld “unfounded” (CBS News, 5 December 2024).
A separate March 2024 investigation by 60 Minutes, The Insider and Der Spiegel reported evidence potentially connecting Russian military intelligence Unit 29155 to incidents, while acknowledging that the evidence was circumstantial (joint investigation). Russia denied the allegations, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov calling them unfounded (Reuters, 1 April 2024).
Our November 2025 reporting argues for Russian responsibility by examining capability, history, motive and interviews. Historical precedent can justify an investigative lead; it cannot substitute for evidence linking a particular actor, device and exposure.
A dated timeline
- Late 2016 and 2017: U.S. personnel in Havana began reporting unusual symptoms; similar reports followed from Guangzhou (National Academies summary).
- December 2020: The National Academies published its assessment of possible mechanisms, including pulsed radiofrequency energy, while identifying substantial evidence gaps (report).
- 8 October 2021: The HAVANA Act became law, authorising payments to eligible personnel and families (Congress.gov).
- 1 February 2022: An intelligence-community experts panel found pulsed electromagnetic energy a plausible explanation for the core characteristics, with information gaps (executive summary).
- January–March 2023: Brazen released the eight original chapters of The Sound (episode archive).
- March 2023: An intelligence assessment judged foreign responsibility very unlikely; it was later recalled, along with its 2025 successor (June 2026 account of the recall).
- March 2024: NIH published its two studies; later that month, 60 Minutes and its partners published their Russian-intelligence investigation (NIH; CBS).
- 5 December 2024: The House Intelligence Committee’s CIA subcommittee called foreign involvement in some cases “increasingly likely” and criticised the 2023 assessment (interim report).
- 10 January 2025: ODNI released its updated assessment, covering information as of December 2024 and recording differing views on capability and possible use (historical assessment).
- July–December 2025: Our written investigation examined the science, medical accounts, attribution and government response.
- 18 December 2025: Congress extended HAVANA Act eligibility to qualifying injuries dating back to 11 September 2001 (Federal Register summary).
- January–March 2026: Reports of U.S. testing of a device renewed scrutiny, followed by our January response and CBS’s March investigation.
- 14 February 2026: The Washington Post reported a Norwegian scientist’s self-test of a pulsed-microwave device (Reuters).
- 22 May 2026: Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard announced her resignation, effective 30 June (Reuters).
- 11 June 2026: The House Intelligence Committee publicly acknowledged the recall of the two intelligence assessments (committee statement).
- 23 June 2026: Seven individuals and Targeted Justice sued the CDC and NIH, seeking recognition and care for civilians who report these incidents; no ruling yet on the claims (court docket).
- 10 July 2026: The Pentagon announced its first HAVANA Act payments, nearly $3 million, and renamed its team the Directed Energy Bio-Effects Cross-Functional Team (Department of War).
- 28 September–19 October 2026: The Globe and Mail reported Canadian intelligence-sharing in Havana; Ottawa denied espionage, promised a briefing and said it was open to mediation with its diplomats (The Globe and Mail; mediation report).
- 13 October 2026: Rey and Zill de Granados published The Havana Syndrome (Penguin Random House).
- 26 October 2026: Mark Lenzi wrote that a House Intelligence Committee report on the government’s handling of the incidents remained unreleased (The Hill).
- 27 October 2026: The Justice Department published its final HAVANA Act rule, effective 27 November (Federal Register).
Markers: official finding or decision money our reporting everything else
Records and questions to follow
Our government-response investigation points readers to the State Department’s June 2018 Havana Accountability Review Board report. For the older Moscow history, the National Security Archive hosts a 10 December 1975 Kissinger–Dobrynin telephone record; it documents an earlier dispute over microwave signals, not proof of what caused the later incidents.
The next useful evidence would address specific gaps rather than simply repeat a preferred explanation:
- Device testing: What protocols, measured exposures and results can be released for independent examination?
- Individual incidents: Can a device, emission or operator be linked to a documented event, with credible timing and chain of custody?
- Medical evidence: Which findings recur in well-defined groups, and how do baseline data, rehabilitation and time to examination affect comparisons?
- Accountability: What further records will establish who made decisions about care, collection and analysis, and on what information?
- Official reassessment: Will a replacement public assessment explain both the evidence and its remaining uncertainties?
- Congressional record: Will the House Intelligence Committee publish its final findings on the intelligence community’s handling of the incidents, and with what supporting records?
- New and allied cases: Will Canada open the independent review that former officials have urged, and will U.S. agencies characterise newly reported cases?
Reporting notes and contact
This guide draws on the six dedicated Whale Hunting articles linked above, Brazen’s original podcast archive, primary public records and subsequent reporting. It does not reproduce unpublished interviews, claim access to classified device tests, or treat descriptions of records in another publication as our independent examination of those records.
The written investigation credits Bradley Hope and Clara Preve; the 2023 introduction includes Zachary Dorfman’s guest contribution, and The Sound is hosted by Nicky Woolf (written reporting; 2023 introduction; series credits). Guide editor: Bradley Hope. Earlier articles retain their publication dates and arguments; this page supplies a dated route through them rather than silently rewriting the archive.
For information relevant to this investigation, contact syndrome@projectbrazen.com. For corrections or other editorial queries, use Whale Hunting’s contact page; choose a suitable confidential channel before sending sensitive material.
Update record: First guide prepared 25 September 2026, including the reported device testing and June recall of the intelligence assessments. Revised 10 November 2026: added developments from 25 September to 10 November (the Rey and Zill de Granados book and responses, Canadian reporting, reported new cases, Lenzi’s account of an unreleased committee report and the Justice Department’s final rule), the Pentagon’s July payments and renaming, the Norwegian device report, the 2022 experts panel, the 2024 House interim report and a section on the sceptical case. Revised again 10 November 2026: added the Ber v. CDC lawsuit, shortened the Walter Reed report, and added a chart of the official record and a filterable timeline. Further developments checked to 10 November 2026. Substantive future revisions should identify what changed and when.
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